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ABSTRACT:
Since the 1970's, the field of forensic economics has grown considerably into a major 
sub-field within the greater discipline of economics. However, the growing demand for 
forensic economists, coupled with the rapid growth of financial compensation for 
forensic economists, has fueled concerns about the effect this expansion is having on the 
overall tone of economic debate, the individual behavior of forensic economists, and the 
ethical credibility of economics as a whole. Through the use of an illustrative case study, 
this paper synthesizes the current discussion regarding the lack of ethical standards in 
forensic economics while evaluating various proposals that have been put forth to restore 
confidence and credibility within forensic economics. The case study demonstrates that 
serious shortfalls still exist in regards to comprehensive ethical standards to guide 
forensic economists and ultimately highlights the need for continued research into the 
issue to find a suitable standard.
I. Introduction
When compared to most other academic disciplines, the field of economics is still 
very young. Before the relatively modem idea of using self-interest to guide economic 
activity there was simply no reason for economic study. Economic decisions were guided 
by tradition and force. However, after the widespread abolition of such conventions, the 
study of economics has grown rapidly and it is now being combined with other 
disciplines and applied in many areas previously ignored. One of the new sub-categories 
within economics is forensic economics, also referred to as litigation economics. Forensic 
economics involves using science, more specifically economic research, to establish facts 
in a legal setting. Ever since the 1970’s, the use of forensic economists as expert 
witnesses and consultants has grown rapidly (Tinari 1993). These economists have been 
used in various types of cases, but the most visible type of cases are tort cases. In tort 
cases, economists are used to help calculate economic damages in cases involving 
wrongful deaths, debilitating injuries, and the like. A positive shift in the demand curve 
for forensic economists also came about in the 1990’s which was driven by a rash of 
mergers, acquisitions, and industry deregulations (Mandel 1999). Recent years have seen 
a growing concern among economists about the effect that the increasing propensity for 
academic economists to engage in litigation support is having on the overall tone of 
economic debate, the individual behavior of forensic economists, and the ethical 
credibility of economics as a whole (Mandel 1999).
In this paper, I will be discussing thU* concerns surrounding forensic economics.
Specifically, I will discuss forensic economists' incentives to engage in unethical
behavior as they involve themselves in an adversarial legal system where financial stakes 
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are often very high for the parties involved. Some of the anecdotal stories of unethical
w
behavior currently swirling through the discourse include deliberate skewing of opinions, 
misrepresentation of study results, inflated claims of statistical certainty, and practicing 
other tactics that give an unwarranted advantage to clients. A recent article in the journal 
Telecommunications Policy has brought to light a possible case of unethical behavior 
among economists, in conjunction with other expert consultants, working for regulated 
telecommunications companies who are dealing with the requirements of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 will use this telecom article as an illustrative case 
study with which to discuss the issues economists face when engaged in litigation support 
and relate it to the wider struggle to establish an ethical standard within forensic 
economics. Research in this area is in its early stages and it is mostly presented in the 
main public forum for such information, The Journal o f Forensic Economics. This is a 
peer-reviewed publication that is maintained by the National Association of Forensic 
Economists (NAFE), a member organization of economists who engage in litigation 
support. Section III ties in some of the analysis that has been published in The Journal 
which is highlighted by the telecom article. Section IV discusses the pros and cons of the 
various solutions to the dilemma of imposing ethical standards on forensic economists.
II. Misuse of the modified t test in telecommunications
On February 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, thus bringing about a new era in telecommunications 
policy (President 1996). At the time of its passing, government and industry advocates of 
the legislation talked of the new world it would spawn in the telecommunications
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industry; a world of lower prices, increased competition, and seamless integration of 
various telecommunications networks (Economides 1998). However, most of the 
provisions of the act had never been implemented before, especially on such a large scale 
(Crandall 2005). Furthermore, the act itself is very ambiguous in its provisions. Although 
many advocates of the legislation were already celebrating the act before it had even been 
ratified, very few had actually taken the time to read the text of the act in its entirety. It 
did not take much time after the passing of the Telecom Act for the realization to occur 
that few people agreed on what the provisions meant or how they should be interpreted 
and implemented (Furchtgott-Roth 2006). The ambiguity and widespread disagreement 
over the provisions within the Telecom Act proved to be the catalyst for extensive 
litigation over the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) attempt at implementing 
the various parts of the legislation.
One major goal of the Telecom Act is its attempt to introduce competition into
regional U.S. local telephone service markets (Opdyke 2004). Prior to the Telecom Act,
local and long distance telephone markets were separated by law. Telephone service
carriers who provided long distance service were prohibited from offering local service
and carriers who provided local service were prohibited from providing long distance
service (Swann and Loomis 2005). The Telecom Act ended this restriction, sort of.
Section 253 (a) of the Telecom Act states “No State or local statute or regulations, or
other State or local requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service" (Wiley
an Wadlow 1996). It seems that this statement ends all artificial barriers to entry in the
telephony industry. However, the act contains more than one-hundred pages of detailed 
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instructions to regulators and prescriptions for opening local telephony markets. In order 
for local telephone service providers, known as regional Bell operating companies 
(RBOC), to enter the long distance markets, they have to prove they are in compliance 
with the fourteen-point competitive checklist in section 271 (c) (2) (B) of the Telecom 
Act (Huber, Kellogg, and Thome 1996). Essentially, the RBOCs are required to prove 
that they have facilitated competition in their local service markets by allowing their 
competitors to interconnect with their network and by also providing their competitors 
with service that is at least equal in quality to the service they provide their own 
customers (Crandall 2005).
The major challenge of these requirements is determining what constitutes service 
of equal quality and how exactly that equality can be tested and verified. The quality of 
service is actually composed of hundreds of performance metrics that are measured and 
recorded by the various RBOCs. These metrics, sometimes referred to as operations 
support services, include operations like how fast a phone line is installed, how fast a line 
is repaired, how often repairs are made within a promised time frame, etc (Opdyke 2004). 
Sometimes, factors beyond the RBOC’s control, like weather or natural disasters, may 
affect the service level they provide to their competitors. This can result in variability 
within the data which is distinct from the potential variability of measurement error. 
Hence, a need came about for a way in which to establish whether or not RBOCs were 
providing service to their competitors that was at least equal to that of their customers as 
specified by the Telecom Act. Logical reasoning led to the utilization of a statistical test, 
since statistical testing is designed to determine, with a certain specified level of 
certainty, whether or not differences within data are due to random chance or true
differences within the data population as represented by the data sample (Opdyke 2004). 
However, the choice of statistical tests provided the foundation for controversy and 
allegations of intentional bias.
Years of statistical and economic research has led to the development of 
numerous statistical tests, each designed for a specific set of conditions and 
circumstances. Perhaps the most important factor to consider when choosing a statistical 
test is figuring out what hypotheses will be tested. The null and alternate hypothesis must 
cover the entire sample space and be mutually exclusive. Improper use of a statistical test 
can lead to skewed results. In a 2004 article in the journal Telecommunications Policy. 
J.D. Opdyke claims that the statistical test advocated to test service parity, that was 
advocated by both the RBOCs and their competitors, and approved by regulators, was 
inappropriate and inconsistent with the hypotheses that are implied by the Telecom Act 
(2004). The text of the Telecom Act requires RBOCs to provide service that is at least 
equal to that of their own customers. Therefore, the null hypothesis should be accepted 
only if the RBOCs have provided equal (or faster) average service AND equal (or less) 
variability in service. The alternative hypothesis, when properly defined, is accepted if 
only one or both of these conditions are not true (Opdkye 2004). An increase in service 
variability alone, even if average service is equal or better, is sufficient to claim disparity 
according to the terms of the Telecom Act. However, the statistical test that was adopted 
to test service parity, known as a both the modified t and modified Z test, was designed 
for “studies where there is a biological basis (e.g., toxicological studies) for expecting a 
treatment effect on mean response to be accompanied by an increase in variance 
(emphasis authors’)” (Brownie, Boos, Hughes-Oliver 1990, 259). This means that both
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conditions in the alternative hypothesis would have to be true to accept it. This slight 
alteration in the alternate hypothesis has the potential to affect the results of the parity 
testing necessitated by the Telecom Act. Opdyke asserts that the modified t statistic, in 
direct contradiction to the claims of the industry, has the potential to encourage ‘gaming’, 
or allowing RBOCs to provide service to its competitors that is, on average, equal to that 
of its own customers but subject to greater variability (2004). In essence, the potential 
exists for RBOCs to provide unequal service to their competitors, but not have the 
violation detected by the statistical parity test, which is a violatioi^of the Telecom Act.
III. Analysis
Many questions arise from this apparent misapplication of a statistical test. Why 
was the use of the modified t test advocated in the first place? Who advocated it? Who 
benefits from its application? Why did the regulators accept it? Trying to find answers to 
these questions leads into the current debate among economists about the proper role and 
the professional responsibilities of economists who involve themselves in litigation 
support.
Take the question of who first advocated the use of the modified t statistic. The 
idea of using the modified t statistic for parity testing was first put forth by a 
conglomerate of RBOC competitors, called the Local Competition Users Group (LCUG), 
on February 6, 1998. The membership of the group consisted of AT&T, Sprint, MCI, 
LCI, and WorldCom (Local Competition Users Group 1998). Expert testimony, solicited 
from both the RBOCs and their competitors, supported the use of the modified t statistic 
in parity testing. Trying to ascertain who those experts were and how many of them were
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economists, or advised by economists, is very difficult. This highlights the first 
important issue within forensic economics: how much litigation support are economists 
actually engaged in? Much of the current discussion on bias among economists focuses 
on courtroom testimony (Tinari 1993). It is not exactly easy, but certainly possible to find 
records of courtroom testimony given by forensic economists. The bigger and more 
widely know the case is, like the Microsoft antitrust suit, the more likely testimony is 
publicly available and easy to access. Once obtained, the testimony can then be compared 
with the economist's academic current academic research for inconsistencies. Under these 
circumstances, bias and unethical behavior among forensic economists is easier to detect. 
Furthermore, when an economist actually testifies and attempts to advantage their client 
by introducing bias into their testimony, the potential exists for an experienced and 
knowledgeable attorney to bring the economist's bias to the attention of the court through 
rigorous cross-examination and have the economist's testimony disallowed.
However, courtroom testimony is actually a small fraction of economists overall 
contribution to litigation support. Most of the work they do involves writing briefs and 
various other written analytical reports, many of which are not easily accessible or 
inaccessible to the public (Tinari 1993). Furthermore, when economists are engaged in 
providing economic strategies for private companies engaged in regulatory matters, like 
the LCUG and its advocacy of the modified t statistic, the chances of the economist’s 
consulting work of facing any sort of peer review or public scrutiny are essentially nil. 
Unless the economist reveals the work they did on behalf of a company, the integrity of 
the work may never be known.
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The second major issue concerning ethics within forensic economics is trying to 
determine who is paying economists to provide their expertise. In the case of the 
modified t statistic, it is almost certain that the RBOCs and their competitors hired 
economists to provide support during regulatory hearings, but it is not publicly known 
how much the economic consultants were paid for their services or how many were 
involved in the case. The idea that large-scale monetary incentives can change some 
people's behavior is a rather uncontroversial assumption, especially among economists. It 
is now becoming evident that the monetary incentives for forensic economists are 
growing very large indeed. It is hard to quantify exactly how big the industry for 
economic consulting work is in America. One attempt, made in 1997, estimated the 
revenues for expert economic consultants to be $300 million for the year (Mandel 1999). 
Documentation of economists changing their conclusions to satisfy a client who pays 
generously is hard to come by, and it is dangerous to make such an assertion of that kind 
of behavior without adequate proof. However, some of the concern comes from the fact 
that lawyers seem to have no trouble finding economists who are interested in the 
lucrative opportunities in economic consulting and litigation support. Currently, there is 
little to guide economists in this newfound opportunity. Theoretically, an economist 
could, over time, provide litigation support for clients on both sides of a dispute. Due to 
the complex and contestable nature of most economic problems, an economist could offer 
to provide litigation support to whichever side offered to pay her more for her services. 
Furthermore, if an economist engaged in litigation support slightly skews some of her 
conclusions to satisfy a wealthy client, by minimizing assumptions, or implying a 
conclusion has a higher level of certainty than the research supports, due to the current
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anonymity of economic consultants, there is little potential for negative consequences for 
the economist. There is currently insufficient evidence to know if forensic economists 
involved in advocating the modified t statistic were swayed by money into supporting a 
misguided application of a statistical test. The possible profits for RBOCs and their 
competitors created by the Telecom Act's provisions allowing them to enter each others 
markets were huge. With so much at stake, it is not implausible to think that the 
telephone service carriers spent a descent amount of money to secure experts who would 
most robustly support the conclusion that had the greatest profit potential for the carriers, 
regardless of the scientific merits of using the modified t test for parity testing.
Trying to figure out who benefits from the use of the modified t statistic leads into 
the question of why it was advocated in the first place. To attempt to answer these 
questions, I must first touch on the nature of bias within economic consulting and 
litigation support. Within current discussion among forensic economists, two forms of 
behavior are cited again and again as the main types of unethical behavior. The first is 
participation in litigation support when one is unaware of the methodology or not updated 
on current developments within forensic economics. The second kind of behavior is 
purposeful manipulation of the result to arrive at a favorable conclusion (Sattler 1991). It 
seems more likely that the case of the modified t statistic was an example of the second 
kind of behavior. There is circumstantial evidence that points toward willful manipulation 
and the advocacy of the modified t test. Uncovering it requires a consideration of the 
incentives for both the RBOCs and their competitors to advocate for implementation of 
an inappropriate statistical test to measure parity.
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As I mentioned above, the Telecom Act tore down all previous barriers 
prohibiting RBOCs from entering long distance markets and prohibiting competitive 
challenge to the RBOCs for the local service markets. While the profit potential from this 
attempt at competition in telephone service are huge, the potential negative consequences 
of the RBOCs being found in violation of the Telecom Act's competitive checklist 
requirements, or providing unequal service to their competitors, are huge as well. The 
most overt threat of penalty the RBOCs have to worry about is monetary fines. If the 
RBOCs are found to be providing disparate service to their competitors, they have to pay 
fines, sometimes in the millions of dollars, to those competitors and in some cases to the 
government (Opdyke 2004). If a RBOC is found to be consistently violating the terms of 
the Telecom Act, permission to enter the long distance service market may be 
permanently revoked by regulators (Opdyke 2004). Revocation is not only bad for the 
RBOC, it is bad for its competitors as well. Should a RBOC be disallowed to enter the 
long distance service market, it no longer has an incentive to facilitate competition in its 
own market and its competitor's loose out on the potential profit opportunities of gaining 
access to the RBOC's local service market. In addition, findings of disparity, with their 
potential for RBOC fines and other restrictions, could cause a loss of investor confidence 
in the industry which in turn could cause creditors to lower the industry's bond and stock 
ratings, creating an impediment to the industry's ability to raise capital. These major 
threats to the health of the telephony industry that come from findings of disparity create 
an incentive for the all the players in the industry, not just the RBOCs, to support a 
statistical test that will result in as few findings of disparity as possible. In this case, if 
willful manipulation did take place, it might not have been just a ploy for reaping higher
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profits but also an attempt to shield a rapidly changing industry from running afoul of the 
terms of the Telecom Act.
The question then becomes if this test is not the best test, and has the potential to 
allow RBOCs to violate the Telecom Act's provision of equal service, why did the 
regulators approve it in the first place. After all, the regulatory agencies have skilled 
professionals working for them which include economists, statisticians, and other support 
staff. Why the regulatory board gave this test approval remains a mystery. Opdyke's 
article refers to the approval as a "glaring oversight" on the part of the regulators (2004). 
This is certainly possible. The differences in the modified t test and statistical tests that 
Opdyke puts forth as more appropriate for the hypotheses to be tested are slight and 
possible to overlook at first glance, although presumably not for skilled professionals. 
Perhaps when the LCUG first proposed the use of the modified t test, their argument was 
so cogent it satisfied or impressed the regulators enough that normal levels of scrutiny 
were not applied. Or perhaps the regulators were influenced by the tendency of 
bureaucrats to protect their position. Hypothetically speaking, if a situation came about 
where consistent findings of disparity led to fines, sanctions and a loss of confidence in 
the industry, scrutiny might become focused on the regulators and their management of 
the industry. Regulators seem to have an incentive of their own to prevent findings of 
disparity as much as possible. While it is interesting to speculate on the possible reasons 
as to why the regulators accepted the modified t test, another more troubling question that 
is raised by this case, which is reflective of a larger issue debated within forensic 
economics, is why has the use of the modified t test has been reaffirmed by numerous 
court rulings and orders by regulatory bodies.
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This is another mystery. It is not impossible to accept the idea that regulators 
made a mistake when they first approved the modified t test. (We could also assume that 
the LCUG made a mistake in advocating the modified t test.) However, if we assume that 
regulators did not recognize that the modified t test was inappropriate for the 
circumstance and its potential to allow gaming by RBOCs when they approved it, logical 
reasoning suggests that somewhere down the line another, more scrupulous regulatory 
body, who was not a party to the original decision to approve usage of the modified t test, 
would recognize the weaknesses of the modified t test and attempt to implement another 
statistical test that was more suited to the hypotheses. One possible impediment to such a 
correction might be a convention within American legal philosophy. The American legal 
process is adversarial, not scientific. The main focus for all involved in the legal process 
is to win the case, not necessarily advance research or contribute to the academic debate 
surrounding an issue. Once an issue is decided, like the acceptance of the modified t 
statistic for parity testing, it becomes a legal precedent and gains an inertia that makes it 
hard to reverse or overturn. This legal doctrine, known as stare decisis, maintains that 
once a legal precedent is set it will not be overturned unless there is good cause to do so 
(Gilbert 1997). What constitutes good cause is debatable, however, the tendency within 
the American legal system is to more often than not let legal rulings stand rather than 
overturn them. This tendency to let rulings stand also influences the regulatory process. 
This may be part of the reason as to why the modified t test is still being used for parity 
testing in the telecommunications regulation.
There is another issue that is also in play for economists who are involved in any 
form of litigation support: credibility. One of the most important characteristics for an
w
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Weconomist to have, or be perceived to have, in order to gain employment as an expert 
witness is credibility (Sattler 1991). Experts who lack credibility are deemed to be of 
little use to attorneys and clients. However, what constitutes credibility in the world of 
academic economics is something entirely different from what constitutes credibility in a 
legal setting. Academic economists are supposed to be open to new ideas. Academic 
economics is similar to other sciences in the respect that when and academic economist's 
ideas and conclusions that she had previously generated are contradicted by new ideas 
that are better supported by the facts, to maintain credibility among her peers she should 
accept and adopt the new ideas (Mandel 1999). The goal in academic economics is the 
pursuit of the truth and those who are willing to consider and adopt new ideas that are 
better supported by the facts gain credibility in the field as an honest and open scientist. 
However, in the legal field, credibility is judged by consistency (Sattler 1991). If an 
expert puts forth an opinion on a subject and later changes her opinion, she opens herself 
for attack by the opposition. A recent example of this happened during the Microsoft 
antitrust case. When Richard Schmalensee was testifying on behalf of Microsoft, he was 
attacked by the prosecution for contradictions between his testimony and an article he 
had written in 1982 (Mandel 1999). Economists who regularly engage in litigation 
support may find it hard to resist the tendency to lock oneself into an opinion, lest they be 
subject to allegations on inconsistency and ultimately lacking credibility. The incentive is 
very strong to avoid losing credibility as it is widely seen to be the most important factor, 
even more so than having the greatest knowledge of the matter at hand (Stufflebean 
1991). Regulatory bodies may also be subject to the same conundrum. In the modified t 
case, a regulatory body that decided to revoke approval of the modified t test for parity
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testing could open itself up to charges of inconsistency amongst regulators and an overall 
loss of credibility. Opdyke speaks to this in his article when he says "An optimistic view 
would hold that such open-minded recognition by commissions would allow relevant, 
applied empirical and analytical research that is new and original, yet rigorously tested 
and thoroughly documented, to disabuse the industry of the inappropriate statistical 
practices it refutes, in spite of legal inertia supporting them..." (2004, 856). Optimistic 
seems to be the key qualifier in this quote, since the modified t test is still in use nearly a 
decade after it was first proposed. An emerging negative externality of litigation support 
for academic economists is a chilling of debate around economic issues, both among 
economists who are engaged in litigation support and those who wish to participate in 
litigation support.
IV. Suggestions for future research
While these problems have begun to become topics of debate within forensic 
economics, the discussion has predictably begun to look toward possible solutions. The 
most widely circulated and promoted solution is an industry-wide code of ethics. Some 
suggest this would be a good first step toward establishing forensic economics as a 
formalized profession. Other professions, like law and medicine, have long-standing 
codes of ethics which have governed their respective members (Piette 1991). It has been 
noted by famed judge and scholar Richard Posner that codes of ethics often develop out 
of industry self-interest. They create a sense of cooperation among professionals to make 
sure the public interest is served and avoid many of the side-effects caused by more 
restrictive measures like registration, certification, and licensing (Posner 1974). The
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wNAFE already has a code in place that governs its members. However, many economists 
who engage in litigation support are not members of the NAFE and thus not bound by 
any formalized ethical considerations. The NAFE code has been suggested as a possible 
starting point for a potential industry-wide code of ethics. The elements that would 
constitute a code of ethics do not seem to be of great dispute among the industry. It is of 
general agreement that a code should reflect such values as equality of opportunity, 
privacy, protection from injury, and self determination. Furthermore, it is generally 
agreed that a code of ethics be specific and honest, neutral, regulative, and enforceable 
(Piette 1991). The concept of enforceability is the only issue that is of substantial 
contention. There is disagreement as to whether or not a code of ethics within forensic 
economics should be binding or not. Many other professions with codes of ethics, like 
law and medicine, require practitioners to be licensed or registered according to 
prescribed means. However, talk of similar requirements is quite controversial among 
forensic economists. As can be expected, most free-market economists are very leery of 
restrictions on the competitive market for any good or service, including the services of 
forensic economists. It has been noted by many detractors of these measures that 
professions that require registration or licensing rarely discipline members for not 
adhering to the code of ethics (Piette 1991). Concern has also been raised as to the 
possible membership of a licensing board and who would control that board. Licensing 
and registration boards for other professions are often staffed with political appointees 
who, over time, begin to restrict membership for reasons outside of serving the public 
interest (Depperschmidt 1994). Additional layers of bureaucracy, in the form of ethics 
committees, may also have to be created to adjudicate disputes if a binding code of ethics
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is implemented. Similar concerns as those raised about licensing board membership have 
been raised about the membership of ethics committees. A non-binding ethics code seems 
much more likely to gain acceptance among forensic economists. Although it would be 
unenforceable in the formal sense, it could provide a reference point for colleagues, 
lawyers, and society to judge the behavior of forensic economists. Hence, a non-binding 
code of ethics would be enforced by social controls.
Another possible remedy to some alleged bias within forensic economics is some 
organizational measure that requires economists engaged in litigation support to disclose 
their past involvement in litigation support. This could include such facts as who they 
have worked for, what their contribution to specific cases was, and how much they have 
been paid for their consulting services. A measure requiring such transparency would 
quell many of the concerns currently plaguing the industry. However, such a requirement 
is likely to be opposed by some forensic economists on the grounds that it violates the 
privacy rights. However, there may be ways to force forensic economists reveal 
information regarding their previous litigation consulting work without formal 
requirements. An organization, such as the NAFE, could take on as part of its mission to 
create an educatory group that trains members of the legal profession on how to craft 
more and better questions that can be used in a legal setting to challenge expert 
economics witnesses and consultants, thereby exposing past instances of unethical 
behavior on the part of a forensic economist. In this sense, forensic economists could take 
a greater share of the responsibility of policing their own ranks; a responsibility that 
currently rests entirely on the legal profession (Johnson 1991).
- 16-
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Another idea that has received little attention is creating a process to register 
qualified forensic economists, in a similar fashion to that of arbiters, and assign members 
to cases on a rotating and regional basis. If the services of a forensic economist are 
requested, one would be chosen from the registry and assigned to the case (Tinari 1993). 
This is a provocative idea that could go a long way toward eliminating incentives among 
forensic economists to bias there testimony because of the pressures of the legal process. 
Forensic economists would not know who they were being hired by and their pay would 
not be dependent on giving favorable testimony for one side or the other, but rather 
presenting sound information backed by economic research. However, many possible 
problems could arise from attempts to implement this idea. For example, the 
aforementioned concerns about the politicization of the membership of an organization 
that operates such a registry would apply. Furthermore, issues of compensation and 
funding under such a plan are left unresolved. If such a registry was implemented would 
there be limits on the compensation a forensic economist could get? Would all 
participants receive the same pay? Who would fund the organization maintaining the 
registry? Although I think this idea holds the most promise, many hurdles would have to 
be overcome in its implementation and in the grand scheme of things it may not be able 
to overcome the ideals of American capitalism and individualism, which to some ardent 
free-marketers are violated by this form of government intervention.
Another idea, that is not a topic in current discussion, is the establishment of a 
nationwide clearinghouse for information regarding forensic economists. Such an 
institution could have regional offices that collect as much information as possible about 
economists' involvement in the legal process, whether it is in the public or private sector,
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torts or regulated industries. Such a system would reduce the costs of evaluating the 
performance of forensic economists. The NAFE has been attempting to collect 
information regarding allegations of bias and unethical behavior among forensic 
economists for the past couple of years, but so far they have not made public any of their 
findings and the process is taking place out of the public eye. The more forensic 
economists work to not only police themselves, but show the public that they are working 
to maintain ethical standards within their own ranks, the greater the public's trust and the 
legal establishment's trust in them will be. While the NAFE's effort to document cases is 
applaudable, the secretive nature of the process does little to combat growing allegations 
of unethical behavior among some forensic economists.
V. Conclusion
As economics continues to develop, its uses and applications will only grow. This 
fact is evidenced by the integration of economics into many older and well established 
disciplines. The new and exciting field of forensic economics is a prime example. The 
use of economists as expert witnesses, which began in the 1970's, is becoming more 
widespread with each passing year. Unfortunately, some concern has sprung up among 
the ranks of economists and outside observers as to the effect that this new career 
opportunity is having on the behavior of economists and the profession as a whole. The 
huge financial stakes of many legal cases, coupled with the narrow focus on success 
within the legal industry, has created concern about the integrity of a discipline that was 
once known as a disinterested science whose main pursuit was the finding truth through 
rigorous research and scholarly debate. Incentives for forensic economists to engage in
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unethical behavior are growing and a call for measures to counter these incentives is 
growing as well. As the case of the modified t statistic demonstrates, manipulation can 
and does take place. However, the case also demonstrates the many shortfalls of the 
current system of controls (or lack thereof) on forensic economists. It is nearly impossible 
to gain access to the information to find out when unethical behavior has been committed 
by a forensic economist, who that economist is, and whether or not that behavior was 
intentional. While some research into the issue is currently being done by the NAFE, 
much more needs to be done if forensic economics is going to end speculation regarding 
member misconduct and establish itself as a true and cohesive profession. Furthermore, 
the NAFE and other concerned parties need to focus more on economists' litigation 
support which takes place behind the scenes, including in the regulated industries. Until a 
more comprehensive and public approach is taken to this problem, it will continue to
x ^ /
burden the field of forensic economics. This paper is an attempt to synthesize the 
research that has been bom our of current discussion surrounding ethics in forensic 
economics while examining some suggestions for remedies of the issue of imposing 
ethical standards on forensic economists. The lack of available research into this problem 
mandates that more be done to make sure the best possible solutions are found and the 
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